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Abstract  
A common perception is that long-term environmental service provision, such as carbon 
sequestration through tree planting, cannot take place unless a landowner has secure and 
enforceable property rights to the land.  This is especially viewed as a problem for Africa, 
where the dominance of customary law coupled with the inability of the state to develop and 
enforce legal institutions, policies and financing have thwarted efforts to introduce formal 
land titling.   
However, in Africa, tree planting and other land investments can also improve land tenure 
security. Our analysis shows that landowners with customary land tenure can be efficient 
providers of long-term environmental services, such as carbon forestry, especially if tree 
planting helps secure their permanent claims to the land.  Under customary tenure, where the 
farmer's tree planting can reduce the threat of eviction, the amount of land allocated to carbon 
forestry may be less than private ownership, but it is certainly more than if tenure security is 
completely absent.  This finding has important implications for the participation in payment 
for ecosystem services (PES) schemes of many poor farmers with customary land tenure, 
especially in Africa.  Not only is customary land tenure dominant throughout the region – 
only about 1% of the land is under formal title – but past efforts to convert rural farmland to 
private ownership have been largely unsuccessful.  Instead, our results support the view that 
carbon forestry and other PES schemes should accommodate the traditional African 
customary tenure systems, and if designed successfully, can both promote carbon forestry and 
benefit the poor. 
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1  Introduction 
Using market-based payment systems to halt deforestation and protect or plant forests for 
carbon sequestration has recently received considerable attention.  A good example is the 
current effort to establish a financial mechanism to reduce emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation (REDD) in developing countries.  The potential for REDD is promising, 
given that forest protection, reforestation and afforestation 
are considered cost-­‐effective methods of reducing carbon emissions (Adhikari 2009).  On the 
forest-farm frontier, there may be tradeoffs between carbon forestry and improving the 
livelihoods of poor smallholders, but also potential synergies (Chhatre and Agrawal 2009). 
However, tenure insecurity is often a major constraint in implementing payment for 
ecosystem services (PES) schemes for forests in developing countries (Adhikari 2009; 
Chhatre and Agrawal 2008, 2009; Wunder 2007, 2008).  Many studies highlight how insecure 
land tenure can undermine the success of PES schemes, as participation in these programs 
often requires evidence of formal land title (Bailis 2006; Jindal et al. 2008; Unurh 2008; 
Wunder 2008; Zibinden and Lee 2005).  For example, Unruh (2008) discusses how tenure 
insecurity limits the effectiveness of afforestation and reforestation carbon sequestration 
projects in Africa, and concludes that, without institutional and policy reform, “the prospects 
are quite dim”. 
While the literature on PES often recommends granting smallholders in developing countries 
formal statutory property rights to overcome tenure insecurity, in Africa the dominance of 
customary law coupled with the inability of the state to develop and enforce legal institutions, 
policies and financing have thwarted efforts to introduce formal land titling (Bruce et al. 
1994; Easterly 2008; Unruh 2008). As a result, only about 1 percent of land in Africa is 
registered and titled formally (Easterly 2008).  Properly enforced statutory property rights in 
Africa are limited to locations of intensive agriculture, fertile lands, mineral reach areas and 
areas closer to infrastructure. Wunder (2006) asks “Can and should these people receive 
PES?” and argues that the main concern for environmental service (ES) buyers should not be 
de jure land rights, but de facto land rights. 
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However, tenure security does not necessarily require the possession of statutory land titles 
(Roth et al.1989; Schlager and Ostrom 1992). For example, in parts of Africa where 
customary land allocation prevails, customary authorities regulate transfers of land, dictate 
land related investments and grant individuals with secure rights for grazing and cultivation, 
without any legal title definition (Besley 1995). Various authors note that in Sub-Saharan 
Africa tenure security is contingent on the continuous use of the land (Braselle et al. 2002; De 
Zeeuw, 1997; Sjaastad and Bromley 1997; Unruh 2008). Permanent land-related investments 
that show visible commitment to the long-term productivity of land, principally tree planting, 
are a well-recognized method of ensuring tenure security. For example, case studies from 
Niger and Kenya indicate that carbon finance transactions can result in overall increased land 
tenure security for landholders and communities participating in reforestation projects (de 
Aquino et al. 2011).  Thus, in addition to the common perception that tenure security leads to 
land-related investment, the reverse can also occur: tree planting and other land investments 
can improve claims to the land (endogenous property right). 
With these institutional factors in mind, this paper explores how participation in carbon 
forestry financed by PES schemes affects the land allocation decision of smallholders 
between crop production and tree planting. We model three scenarios for a representative 
smallholder: the land allocation decision under private ownership, under insecure tenure 
where the farmer faces an exogenous threat of eviction, and under customary tenure where the 
endogenous property right ensures that the smallholder’s risk of eviction is reduced through 
converting and afforesting cropland. For each scenario, we also derive the imputed value of 
forested land and the corresponding optimal PES.  
Using this framework, we demonstrate that, if the landholder is faced with an exogenous 
random threat of eviction, less land will be converted to carbon forestry compared to when the 
eviction threat is absent.  Although tree planting under customary tenure is less than under 
private ownership, where the farmer’s tree planting can reduce the threat of eviction, the 
amount of land allocated to carbon forestry is greater than under insecure tenure. The latter 
result accords with findings suggesting that the prospect of increased tenure security 
encourage African farmers with customary tenure to continue to commit resources beyond the 
point where marginal cost and benefits normally would converge (Sjaastad and Bromley 
1997). The implication is that in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa land allocated for tree 
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plantation under customary tenure may be less than under private ownership, but it is certainly 
more than if tenure security is completely absent. 
The results of the model have far reaching policy implication in the design of  carbon forestry 
PES schemes intended to reduce terrestrial emissions and enhance farmer livelihoods, 
especially under the conditions found in Africa and other developing regions where formal 
land titling is either not an option or ineffective in guaranteeing tenure security. Although 
much of the PES literature focuses on secure tenure as a requirement for participating in 
carbon forestry PES schemes, we find that the prospect of improving the security of tenure 
can also act as a potential incentive mechanism for tree plantation.  This implies that, in 
situations where the production of environmental services requires a long-term commitment 
of land resources, a win-win PES scheme can be designed for poor farmers with only 
customary land tenure. As African agriculture is dominated by customary land holdings, 
working with the existing de jure land right system is not necessarily an impediment to 
carbon forestry PES schemes; to the contrary, a properly designed scheme with appropriate 
incentives can both increase carbon forestry on customary land and improve the livelihoods of 
millions of African farmers.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop a theoretical model of 
competing land uses between crop production and carbon sequestration tree plantation under 
private ownership. In section 3 we extend the basic model to take into account the effect of 
exogenous risk of eviction in the smallholder’s land allocation decision. In section 4 we 
develop a third version of the model to take into account land allocation under customary 
tenure, the most plausible scenario in Sub-Saharan Africa. In section 5, we calculate the 
optimal PES under each type of land tenure regime.  In the concluding section 6, we discuss 
the major policy implication for carbon forestry in Africa based on our findings. 
2  Smallholder land allocation under private property 
The provision of environmental services, for example carbon sequestration, is affected by the 
landholder’s use of agricultural land.	  	  In this section, we model the land allocation decision of 
a smallholder with an initial fixed amount of land, represented by ( ) 00L L= , allocated to 
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crop production. The smallholder may also have some initial land devoted to a carbon 
sequestration tree plantation, ( ) 00 0F F= ≥ .  The main land use decision is whether the 
farmer is willing to convert existing cropland to carbon forestry.  In the following version of 
the problem, we assume that the smallholder has secure and properly enforced private 
property rights to all the land.  
At any time t, let ( )L t denote the amount of land allocated to crop production, and ( )F t the 
amount of land allocated to tree plantation. We assume that the farmer converts the land from 
one use to the other gradually over time. If ( )c t is the amount of land converted in each period 
from crop production to carbon forestry, then 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
0  ,         ( )
t
L t L c s ds L t c t= − = −∫ &
.      (1) 
Similarly, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
0 ,           
t
F t F c s ds F t c t= + =∫ &
       (2) 
Equations (1) and (2) indicate that ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 ( )F t F L L t= + −  implying that the amount of 
afforested land is correspondingly increasing (decreasing) by a unit for each unit increase 
(decrease) in agricultural land. It is also assumed that no clearing of trees for crop production 
occurs, i.e., ( ) 0c t ≥ .  
Note that if the smallholder does not receive compensation for the carbon forestry tree 
planting, then the farmer would ignore this benefit in the private land use decision-making.  
The result is a social welfare loss due to the underproduction of the externality generating 
activity, carbon forestry, by the smallholder. This is likely to be one of the factors 
contributing to the observed reduction in some ecosystem services provided by agricultural 
lands (Kroeger and Casey 2007). PES schemes for carbon afforestation, like other market 
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mechanisms, are intended to induce farmers to incorporate the economic value of tree 
planting and thus attain a social optimum (Pattanayak et al. 2010; Pagiola and Platais 2007).                           
Crop production 
For simplicity, we assume a single crop is produced and hence further complications arising 
from crop rotation and multiple crop production is suppressed. In producing this single crop, 
in addition to land, in each period the smallholder employs a vector of conventional variable 
inputs ( )z t at a total cost ( )( ), 0, 0W z t W Wʹ′ ʹ′ʹ′> < . The crop production function is then 
( ) ( ) ( )( ), ,  0, 0, 0, 0, 0L LL z zz Lz zLq t f L t z t f f f f f f= > ≤ > ≤ = ≥ ,   (3) 
where !(!) is output at time t. Equation (3) indicates crop production is a concave function of 
both conventional inputs and land. This latter relationship is due to the assumption that land 
quality is heterogeneous, and the most productive land is used for crop production first. Note 
that the relationship ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 0F t F L L t= + − allows the crop production function (3) to 
be rewritten as ( ) ( ) ( )( ), ,  0, 0F FFq t f F t z t f f= < ≥ .  A continuous conversion of 
agricultural land to tree plantation reduces output at increasing rate.  
If P is the price of the crop and r is the farmer’s private discount rate, then the present value 
of stream of profit from crop production received by the private land holder is 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
0
,
T
rtPf L t z t W z t e dt−π = −∫ .      (4) 
Tree plantation for carbon sequestration 
A landholder with a clearly defined and defendable private property right has the option to 
participate in local or international PES carbon forestry schemes. A farmer would enter 
contracts to adopt tree plantation for a specified period. According to Wunder (2008), a PES 
scheme of this sort can be economically viable if and only if the payment for the 
environmental service, such as carbon sequestration, should cover the forgone income plus 
transaction costs of afforestation. 
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Payments made to farmers participating in a tree plantation PES scheme can be indexed to 
output where the payment is based on the amount of carbon sequestered. However, the most 
widely used approach is area-based indexation in which the contract between the ES buyer 
and the farmer stipulates the size of land for carbon forestry (Wunder 2007). For example, the 
Nhambita Community Carbon Project (Mozambique) deposits US$40.50 per hectare (ha) of 
land brought under carbon sequestration (Jindal et al. 2008). We therefore assume that the 
farmer receives a payment based on the area of land devoted to tree plantation, where
( )( ), 0 and  0B F t B Bʹ′ ʹ′ʹ′> ≤  is the periodic payment received by the farmer. Let 
( )( )C c t be the total cost of converting ( )c t units of land from cropland into tree plantation, 
and that 0, 0C Cʹ′ ʹ′ʹ′> >  and ( ) ( )0 0 0C Cʹ′= = . It follows that the present value of net return 
from tree plantation under the PES scheme is 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
0
T
rt rTM B F t C c t e dt e R F T− −⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦∫ .       (5) 
The last term, ( )( )rTe R F T− , in (5) is the salvage value representing the revenue from clear 
cut harvesting of the standing trees at the end of the PES contract at time T. For example, The 
Forests Absorbing Carbon dioxide Emissions Forestation Programme (PROFAFOR) of the 
highland region of Ecuador applies the area based PES scheme and the contract allows at the 
end of the 15 to 20 year cycle a minimum of 70% of the revenue from the sale of harvested 
trees is received by landowners (Wunder 2007).  Note that, as it is assumed that the 
smallholder continues farming beyond T, there is no corresponding salvage value associated 
with cropland. 
Maximizing aggregate returns 
The objective of the smallholder is to choose the optimal land allocation to maximize the 
aggregate present value return from all land uses, i.e.,V M= π+ , by choosing the optimal 
variable inputs ( )z t and the rate of land conversion ( )c t  
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( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
,
0
,
T
rt rT
z c
MaxV Pf F t z t W z t B F t C c t e dt e R F T− −⎡ ⎤= − + − +⎣ ⎦∫  (6) 
subject to (2) and the non-negativity constraints imposed on the control variables ( ) 0z t ≥ and
( ) 0c t ≥ . However, ignoring the time argument, the current value Hamiltonian of the 
problem is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),H Pf F z W z B F C c c= − + − +µ       (7) 
where ( )tµ is the co-state variable that represents the shadow, or imputed, value of afforested 
land.  
The first-order conditions of the problem are 
( ) ( )[ ]0, 0, 0z zPf W z t z t Pf Wʹ′ ʹ′− ≤ ≥ − =       (8) 
( ) ( )[ ]0, 0, 0C c t c t Cʹ′ ʹ′µ− ≤ ≥ µ− =       (9) 
Lr Pf Bʹ′µ = µ+ −& .        (10) 
Condition (8) indicates that, if conventional inputs are employed, i.e. ( ) 0z t > , then the value 
marginal product of an additional input equals the marginal cost of using the input. Condition 
(9) determines whether or not the smallholder will convert any cropland to carbon forestry.  
For ( ) 0c t > requires that the farmer converts crop land into afforested land until the marginal 
cost of conversion equals the shadow value of converted land. However, if Cʹ′µ < , then it is 
not worthwhile for the farmer to convert cropland to carbon forestry, and ( ) 0c t = .   
Condition (10) describes the dynamics of the shadow value of afforested land, and it indicates 
that in making the optimal land allocation decision there are capital gains to consider. It also 
suggests, along the optimal path, the marginal profit from the converted land, Bʹ′µ+& , must 
  16 
equal the foregone returns if the farmer leaves the land for the original crop production use
Lr Pfµ+ .  
The corresponding transversality condition is 
( ) ( )( )T R F Tʹ′µ = ,        (11) 
which indicates that, at the end of the planning horizon T, the marginal benefit of an increase 
in ( )F T  through its contribution to tree harvest value at the end of the PES contract is equal 
to the marginal cost of such increase represented by ( )Tµ . 
Combining (9) and (10), and rearranging, yields 
LPfB r
C C
ʹ′µ
+ = +
ʹ′ ʹ′µ
&
,        (12) 
 which specifies that along the optimal path of conversion the internal rate of return, i.e. the 
increase in the value of the afforested land plus relative marginal return from carbon forestry, 
is equal to the opportunity cost of conversion, i.e. the discount rate plus the forgone relative 
marginal returns from crop production.1 
As discussed previously, if farmers do not receive compensation for the production of trees 
characterized by positive externalities, their private decision-making would lead to 
underproduction of carbon forestry. Thus it is reasonable to assume that, at the beginning of 
the PES scheme at time 0, ( )0F F T< where ( )F T  is the standing stock of trees at the end of 
the PES contract at time T.  This implies that ( )0µ , a measure of the initial desirability of 
land for carbon forestry relative to crop production, is positive. Given (9), and provided that
Cʹ′µ = so that cropland conversion is justified, it follows that initially c is large during the 
PES scheme. However, over time as more land is converted for carbon forestry,  ! and  ! will 
fall. As the transversality condition (11) requires the shadow value of land for tree plantation 
 
 
1 Condition (12) is a standard result in economic models of competing land uses; e.g., see Amacher et al. (2009); Barbier (2008) 
and Hartwick et al. (2001). 
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use to be positive at the end of the PES contract, then there will also be a positive stock of 
afforested land at time T. 
3  Smallholder land allocation under exogenous tenure 
insecurity 
We now extend the basic model to take into account the effect of exogenous tenure insecurity 
on the farmer’s optimal land allocation between crop production and carbon forestry. A 
concern in the literature is the lack of common definition of tenure insecurity. Roth et al., 
(1989) offer a workable definition as “the land owner’s perception of the probability of losing 
land within some future time period.’’  Alternatively, one can associate tenure insecurity with 
the perceived probability of losing specific rights in land such as the right to cultivate the 
land, graze, fallow, and transfer through sell, rent or inheritance.  
We therefore view tenure insecurity as the smallholder’s perceived probability of the risk of 
eviction. Let τ be the time at which eviction occurs, and assume it is a continuous random 
variable specified as the cumulative distribution function ( ) ( )PrG t t= τ < .  The 
corresponding probability density function is ( ) ( )G t g tʹ′ = . A related concept is the survival 
function, which refers to the probability that farmer survives eviction up to time t, or
( ) ( ) ( )1 PrS t G t t= − = τ ≥ . Finally, in our model the hazard rate function, denoted by ( )h t , 
is the conditional probability of eviction at time t, given that the smallholder has not been 
evicted up to that time.  Formally, these probabilities are related, as 
( ) ( )
( )
( )lng t d S tSh t
S t S dt
= = − = −
&
and thus ( ) ( ){ }0exp
t
S t h v dv= −∫ . 
This last expression enables us to introduce a new state variable 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
ln , , 0 0
t Sy t S t h v dv y h t y
S
= − = = − = =∫
&& .    (13) 
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In this version of our model, we assume that tenure security is purely exogenous to the 
farmer; that is, no actions by the smallholder can affect the probability of eviction. Thus we 
have a constant hazard rate function i.e., ( )h t = θ , and the survival function is 
( ) ( ){ }0exp
t tS t h v dv e−θ= − =∫ .   
If there is neither a penalty nor compensation at the time of eviction, the problem of the 
farmer is simply to maximize the expected present value of the aggregate returns earned from 
all land uses until time τ. Note also that if the smallholder has not been evicted by the end of 
the PES contract at time T, a return  !(! ! ) is earned by clear cutting the remaining stand of 
trees. Thus the farmer chooses ( )z t and ( )c t  to maximize the expected present value of 
aggregate returns from competing land uses  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
,
0
,
T
rt y t rT y T
z c
Max J Pf F t z t W z t B F t C c t e dt e R F T− − − −⎡ ⎤= − + − +⎣ ⎦∫  (14) 
subject to (2), (13) and the non-negativity constraints imposed on the control variables
( ) 0z t ≥ and ( ) 0c t ≥ .  Note that now there is an additional premium in the discount rate due 
to the additional state variable ( )y t . Consequently, following Reed and Heras (1992), we 
employ the conditional current value Hamiltonian (the current value Hamiltonian divided by
( )y te−  ) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2,H Pf F z W z B F C c c h= − + − +µ +µ% % %      (15) 
where 1µ%and 2µ%are the conditional current shadow values of afforested land and ( )y t , 
respectively.2   
  
 
 
 
2 Following the proof by Reed and Heras (1992), with the assumption of no penalty or reward at the time of eviction from the 
land, !! = −!(!) where W (t) is the aggregate value of all the land at time t provided that the farmer is not evicted at time t. 
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The first-order conditions are 
( ) ( )[ ]0, 0, 0z zPf W z t z t Pf Wʹ′ ʹ′− ≤ ≥ − =       (16) 
( ) ( )[ ]1 10, 0, 0C c t c t Cʹ′ ʹ′µ − ≤ ≥ µ − =% %       (17) 
( )1 1 Lr y Pf Bʹ′µ = + µ + −&% & %         (18) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 ,r y Pf F z W z B F C cµ = + µ + − + −&% & % .     (19) 
And the transversality conditions that specify the value of the co-state variables at time T are 
( ) ( )( )1 T R F Tʹ′µ =% and ( ) ( )( )2 T R F Tµ = −% .      (20) 
Combining (17) and (18) and rearranging yields 
1
1
LPfB r
C C
ʹ′µ
+ = + θ +
ʹ′ ʹ′µ
&%%          (21) 
Along the optimal path of conversion, the internal rate of return from converting and 
afforesting land must equal to the opportunity cost of converting cropland.  Note that, 
compared to condition (12) for the private property right case, now we have an additional 
term θ that increases the effective discount rate.  The result is an increase in the opportunity 
cost of tree planting, due to the risk of eviction. The implication is that less land will be 
converted to carbon forestry compared to the case when the eviction threat is absent. 
In sum, if the risk of eviction from land is independent of the action of the farmer, then its 
presence acts to increase the effective discount rate, r + θ , and less land will be allocated to 
tree plantation. 
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4  Smallholder land allocation under customary land 
tenure 
When land rights are predominantly informal and customary, farmers engage in permanent 
investments that show visible commitments to the long-term productivity and continued use 
of the land, thereby improving tenure security. Among such investments, tree planting is a 
well-recognized method of ensuring tenure security (Unruh 2008; Braselle et al. 2002; De 
Zeeuw, 1997; Sjaastad and Bromley 1997; de Aquino et al. 2011). Thus, in addition to the 
common perception that tenure security leads to land-related investment, the reverse can also 
occur; i.e., property rights can be endogenous.  For example, Braselle et al., (2002) find that in 
Burkina Faso farmers undertake tree planting and other land-related investments primarily to 
improve tenure security rather than as a response to secure tenure. Likewise, Deininger (2003) 
shows that in Ethiopia insecure tenure encourages planting of trees. In Niger and Kenya, 
carbon financing of reforestation has improved the land tenure security of participating 
landownders and communities (de Aquino et al. 2011). 
In this section, we therefore model the risk of eviction as an endogeneous variable. For a 
smallholder with customary land tenure, we assume that the hazard rate is inversely related to 
the amount of land committed to carbon forestry, i.e. ( ) ( )( ), 0h t F t ʹ′= θ θ < .  It follows 
that the state equation (13) is now 
( ) ( )( ) ( ), 0 0y h t F t y= = θ =& .       (22) 
The farmer’s problem is the same as before, which is to maximize (14) subject to (2), (22) and 
the non-negativity constraints imposed on the control variables ( ) 0z t ≥ and ( ) 0c t ≥ .   The 
corresponding conditional current value Hamiltonian is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2,H Pf F z W z B F C c c F= − + − +ρ +ρ θ%     (23) 
where 1ρ and 2ρ are the conditional current shadow values of afforested land and ( )y t , 
respectively. 
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The first order conditions for maximization are 
( ) ( )[ ]0, 0, 0z zPf W z t z t Pf Wʹ′ ʹ′− ≤ ≥ − =       (24) 
( ) ( )[ ]1 10, 0, 0C c t c t Cʹ′ ʹ′ρ − ≤ ≥ ρ − =       (25) 
( )1 1 2Lr y Pf Bʹ′ ʹ′ρ = + ρ + − −ρ θ& &        (26) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 ,r y Pf F z W z B F C cρ = + ρ + − + −& & .     (27) 
And the transversality conditions that specify the value of the co-state variables at time T are 
( ) ( )( )1 T R F Tʹ′ρ = and ( ) ( )( )2 T R F Tρ = − .      (28) 
As before, from condition (25) and (26) one obtains 
( )1 2
1
LB Pfr F
C C
ʹ′ ʹ′ρ +ρ θ
+ = + θ +
ʹ′ ʹ′ρ
&
       (29) 
Along the optimal path of conversion the internal rate of return now includes the impact of 
afforestation in decreasing the relative risk of eviction, 2 0Cʹ′ ʹ′ρ θ > .
3  As before is equal to 
the opportunity cost of conversion, i.e. the effective discount rate r + θ   plus the forgone 
relative returns to crop production. The implication is that, in the presence of endogeneous 
tenure security, the internal rate of return from tree plantation is higher, and as a result, more 
land will be converted to carbon forestry compared to when tenure security is exogenous. 
Condition (29) is also analogous to the optimal land allocation rule (12) derived under the 
assumption of private ownership, except now we have two addition terms: ( ) 0Fθ > on the 
right hand side and 2 0Cʹ′ ʹ′ρ θ >  on the left hand side. The additional term ( ) 0Fθ >  
increases the effective discount rate, thereby decreasing the land allocated to tree plantation as 
the risk of eviction means that any returns may not be realized in the future. The effect of
 
 
3 As discussed in the previous note, by definition !! = −! ! < 0, where W (t) is the aggregate value of all the land at time t 
provided that the farmer is not evicted at time t. 
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2 0Cʹ′ ʹ′ρ θ >  is to increase the net marginal benefit from carbon forestry by reducing the risk 
of eviction, as an increase in the stock of trees improves the smallholder’s tenure security. 
However, given that ( ) ( )1( )
y tt e tρ = µ , the optimal land allocated to carbon sequestration tree 
plantation at the end of the PES contract at time T is less under customary tenure than in a 
private ownership regime.4 ( ) 2F Cʹ′ ʹ′θ > ρ θ ( ) 2F Cʹ′ ʹ′θ < ρ θ   
5  The optimal payment for carbon forestry 
In the previous sections, we argued that the purpose of a PES scheme is to maintain and 
expand the flow of positive externalities by internalizing benefits. In the absence of such 
compensation, in the case of carbon forestry this implies less than optimal land allocated to 
tree plantation. Wunder (2008) emphasize that a PES scheme can be economically viable and 
will be accepted by the ecological service provider if and only if the payment for the 
environmental service is at least as large as the opportunity cost plus any transaction cost. In 
our analysis, we assume that there are no transaction costs associated with the PES scheme, in 
order to focus our attention on the opportunity costs to the farmer of allocating existing 
cropland to tree planting for carbon forestry. 
It is relatively straightforward to calculate the optimal payment for carbon forestry each of the 
land tenure regimes that we have analyzed.  For example, in the case of private property, 
rearranging equations (9) and (10) yields 
( ) LPfBt C
r r
ʹ′+µ
ʹ′µ = − ≤
&
.        (30) 
The shadow value of afforested land is the difference between the capitalized marginal 
benefits of carbon forestry on that land, ( )B rʹ′+µ&   and the capitalized marginal returns from 
foregone crop production on that land, LPf r .  Moreover, for the smallholder to convert 
 
 
4 For example, the first transversality condition in (28) can be rewritten as ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
y TT e T R F Tʹ′ρ = µ = . Compared to (11), it 
is clear that ( )( )R F Tʹ′ must be larger, which in turn requires ( )F T to be smaller, assuming the normal property that 0Rʹ′ʹ′ < . 
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cropland to carbon forestry, i.e. ( ) 0c t > , this difference must equal the marginal cost to the 
smallholder of converting cropland to carbon forestry,Cʹ′ . Thus the smallholder must receive 
a payment in each period equal to ( )B rʹ′+µ&  in order to engage in the carbon forestry 
scheme.  If not, then the smallholder will not be compensated for the opportunity cost of 
converting cropland to carbon forestry, LPf r , and no afforestation will take place.  That is, 
Cʹ′µ < , and ( ) 0c t = . 
Note that, as discussed previously, both ( )tµ and ( )c t should be large initially and decline as 
more cropland is converted to carbon forestry during the PES scheme. In addition, as ( )F t
increases over time, Bʹ′ will fall. It follows that the optimal payment to the farmer should 
initially be large and decline over the life of the PES contract.     
Similarly, for the case of exogenous tenure insecurity, from equations (17) and (18)  
1
1
LB Pf C
r r
ʹ′+µ
ʹ′µ = − ≤
+ θ + θ
&%% .        (31) 
The optimal carbon forestry payment is again the capitalized marginal benefits of carbon 
forestry on afforested land, ( ) ( )1B rʹ′+µ +θ&% . However, this payment must now take into 
account the higher effective discount rate due to the threat of eviction.  The result may be that 
the payment is lower than in the case of private property, but this outcome is unclear. The 
change in the conditional shadow value, 1µ&%may be different than forµ&. However, as in the 
private property case, the optimal carbon forestry payment should be large initially but then 
fall as the PES contract proceeds.  
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For customary land tenure, from (25) and (26) 
( ) ( )
1 2
1
LB Pf C
r F r F
ʹ′ ʹ′+ρ +ρ θ
ʹ′ρ = − ≤
+θ +θ
&
.       
 (32) 
The carbon forestry payment now must include the benefit of afforestation through reducing 
the risk of eviction, 2 ʹ′ρ θ .  In addition, as more land is converted to carbon forestry, and ( )F t
increases, the effective discount rate r + θwill decline.  Thus the carbon forestry payment for 
a smallholder under customary land tenure is likely to be larger than for a farmer facing an 
exogenous threat of eviction.  However, once again, the optimal payment to the smallholder 
with customary tenure should be large initially and decline over the life of the PES contract. 
6  Discussion 
Wunder (2006 and 2008)  defines genuine  PES  schemes as those that satisfy the following 
five criterions; (1) voluntary transaction where (2) a well-defined ES (or corresponding land 
use) is (3) being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) ES buyer (4) from a (minimum one) ES 
provider (5) if and only if ES provision is secured (conditionality). This implies that PES 
schemes involve voluntary, negotiated, explicit contracts between environmental service (ES) 
providers and ES buyers. The conditionality criterion suggests that these contracts need to 
clearly specify that PES are contingent to ES provision on continuous basis which in turn 
require secure property right in the part of the ES provider. 
However, imposing tenure security, commonly associated with possession of land title, as a 
requirement for farmer’s participation in carbon sequestration projects tends to exclude many 
poor farmers (Swallow and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Jindal et al 2008; Unruh, 2008; Wunder, 
2006). For example in Costa Rica, when landowners who lacked formal title were excluded 
from the PES program,  many of the poor were prevented from participating as they were 
more likely to lack titles than better-off farmers (Pagiola 2002). The problem is even worse 
for poor farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa where customary tenure without clear titles prevails. 
Properly enforced statutory property rights in Africa are limited to locations of intensive 
agriculture, fertile lands, mineral reach areas and areas closer to infrastructure (Unruh 2008). 
 25 
As a result, only about 1 percent of land in Africa is registered and titled formally (Easterly 
2008).  Consequently, despite the belief that tree-based carbon sequestration is ideal for Sub-
Saharan Africa, such PES arrangements are currently scarce in the continent (Jindal et al. 
2008; Unruh 2008). For example, out of the 23 carbon sequestration projects approved under 
the Kyoto protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism only two were in Africa (Jindal et al. 
2008).  
There is a growing skepticism about the common association of tenure security with the 
possession of statutory land titles (Roth et al.1989; Schlager and Ostrom 1992). For example, 
in parts of Africa where customary land allocation prevails, the customary authority, such as a 
tribal chief, grants  individuals with secure rights for grazing and cultivation, without any 
legal title definition, registration, or government enforcement. Customary authorities may also 
regulate transfers of land and dictate land related investments (Besley 1995). On the other 
hand, high levels of tenure insecurity may exist even with statutory title.  This might happen 
when there is a lack of institutions with both legal backing and social legitimacy that are 
accessible by and accountable to the holders of property rights. Mindful of this fact, Pagiola 
(1999) asserts that lack of title should not automatically be equated with tenure insecurity. 
Generally, in identifying PES participants, a formal land title may not be necessary as long as 
tenure is secure (Pagiola et al. 2005). Similarly, Wunder (2006) argues that the main concern 
for environmental service (ES) buyers should not be de jure land rights, but de facto land 
rights. 
In Africa, the dominance of customary law coupled with the inability of the state to develop 
and enforce legal institutions, policies and financing have thwarted efforts to introduce formal 
land titling to ensure secure property right (Bruce et al. 1994; Easterly 2008; Unruh 2008).  
For instance, although the land tenure reforms in Niger during the 1980s and 1990s allowed 
customary rights to be register as statutory rights, ambiguity about what rights to register and 
insufficient administrative preparedness led many farmers to opt out of formalizing their 
customary land tenure (Benjaminsen et al. 2008).  Even when the capacity to introduce formal 
land titling exists, community-based systems of land rights may better meet the needs of 
farmers with customary tenure (Toulmin 2008; Fitzpatrick 2005).  
Communal land titling may also be a cost-effective way of ensuring tenure security, provided 
that community members have clear rights over their plots (Roth et al.1989; Schlager and 
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Ostrom 1992).  As a consequence, in recent years there has been a resurgence of formal 
recognition of customary land rights. In Mozambique, although land belongs to the state, 
communities are allowed to manage land rights according to customary practices (Kanji et al. 
2007). Similarly, the government of Ghana recognizes the role of customary tribal leaders and 
community decisions in allocating land, and in South Africa, the titling of communal land 
occurs through communal property associations (CPAs) (Cousins 2002). In Namaqualand, 
South Africa, local communities were allowed to vote between land privatization, CPA 
ownership or municipal ownership. Although one communal area opted out of the vote, four 
communities chose CPA ownership and one voted for municipal ownership (Benjaminsen et 
al. 2008) 
Under customary land rights, tenure security is contingent upon continued use of the land and 
eviction is likely when land is scarce and when land is abandoned for extended time. 
However, in Sub-Saharan Africa, where land is the mainstay of households and has been 
becoming scarce overtime mainly due to population pressure, there is little incentive to 
abandon land and thus security is ensured (Sjaastad and Bromley 1997). In fact, a common 
method of securing land tenure is through permanent investment. Farmers invest in trees, 
buildings and other fixed structures to show to the customary authorities and other members 
of the community their commitment to the long-term productivity of the land and this usually 
insures continued use of the land and thus tenure security is implied. 
This has led various authors to conclude that accommodating the characteristics of African 
tenure systems is the way forward to promote successful tree-based carbon sequestration 
projects that can reduce terrestrial emission and benefit the poor (Jindal et al. 2008; Unruh 
2008). Already, some schemes in Africa are accommodating local tenure arrangements. For 
example, the Nhambita Community Carbon Project in Mozambique involves land held under 
customary tenure (Jindal et al. 2008). 
The results of our analysis confirm that informal property right systems may, under certain 
conditions, help rather than hinder tree planting for carbon sequestration.  A farmer with 
customary land tenure enjoys additional benefit from carbon forestry in the form of reduced 
risk of eviction due to tree planting enhancing claims to the land. Although our results 
indicate that the optimal land allocated to carbon sequestration tree plantation under 
customary tenure might not be as much as compared to the private ownership regime, the 
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additional benefit of reducing tenure insecurity can significantly influence how households 
manage their land. As Sjaastad and Bromley (1997, p 557) note, any "conclusive statement 
about which regime provides the higher investment incentive cannot be given”, because in 
Sub-Saharan Africa the “prospect of increased tenure security will lead a farmer with 
indigenous tenure to continue to commit resources … beyond the point where marginal cost 
and benefits normally would converge.” 
Because carbon forestry entails a long term commitment, secure property rights over land 
resources are clearly relevant for carbon sequestration PES schemes. However, there is an 
important distinction between secure tenure being required as a condition for participating in 
carbon sequestration tree plantation PES scheme as opposed to secure tenure also being a 
potential incentive mechanism for tree planting. In situations where the production of 
environmental services requires long-term commitment of land resources, for example carbon 
forestry, a win-win PES scheme can be designed for farmers with customary land tenure that 
reduces poverty, tenure insecurity and environmental degradation.    
Our analysis also indicates that, in the presence of exogenous random eviction threat, less 
land will be converted to carbon forestry compared to when land is under private property or 
customary tenure. Smallholders with land tenure that is insecure, transitory, or weakly 
enforced cannot be efficient providers of carbon forestry, mainly for two reasons. First, a 
smallholder facing exogenous eviction threats discounts the future heavily, and thus is less 
willing to participate in a carbon forestry program that requires a long term contract. Second, 
because insecure tenure implies that others might occupy a smallholder's land or harvest the 
resources, a PES scheme may actually threaten land claims by the poor (Jindal et al. 2008). 
For instance, in Bualeba Reserve in Uganda a carbon sequestration project actually led to 
increased eviction of local people from their rights for farming, grazing, fishing, and timber 
collection.   
Although PES schemes are conceptualized and undertaken as a mechanism to improve the 
efficiency of natural resource management, many proponents have argued that PES can also 
have positive impacts on poverty (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002; Pagiola 2002). Our analysis 
provides some support for this view. As we have noted, the most widely used approach in 
designing PES payment is the area-based indexation scheme, in which the contract is based on 
the amount of land aside for carbon forestry. In such a scheme, the opportunity cost of the 
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land is an important factor determining farmer participation. A carbon forestry PES scheme 
may be less attractive to landowners with high-productivity land  as their opportunity cost 
(forgone crop production) is much higher, while farmers with less productive land (usually 
the poor) in crop production are more likely to participate in the scheme.  As far as this 
economic relationship is concerned, the PES scheme seems pro-poor. Evidence from Latin 
America supports this effect. For example, Wunder (2008) maintains that voluntary user-
financed PES programs in Bolivia (Los Negros) and Ecuador (Pimampiro and PROFAFOR) 
benefited poor farmers.  As we have also shown, poor farmers with customary land tenure 
may receive an additional incentive for participation, if tree planting enhances their tenure 
security.  However, our results do not include any analysis of the transaction costs faced by 
the poor in carbon forestry schemes, as they have the effect of excluding poor smallholders 
and may be significant in developing countries with poor institutions (Bromley	  2008;	  
Wunder 2007; Swallow and Meinzen-Dick 2009).  
7  Conclusion 
A common perception is that long-term environmental service provision, such as carbon 
sequestration through tree planting, cannot take place unless a landowner has secure and 
enforced private property rights to the land.  Our analysis explores the conditions under which 
PES carbon forestry can be targeted to smallholders without statutory land titles but with 
well-functioning customary land rights. We show that landowners with customary land tenure 
can be efficient providers of long-term environmental services, such as carbon forestry, 
especially if tree planting helps secure their permanent claims to the land.  Empirical evidence 
from Niger and Kenya indicate that these effects might be significant (de Aquino et al. 2011). 
This conclusion has important implications for the participation in PES schemes of many poor 
farmers with customary land tenure, especially in Africa.  Not only is customary land tenure 
dominant throughout the region, but past efforts to convert rural farmland to private 
ownership have been largely unsuccessful. Mindful of this reality, a number of African 
governments have begun introducing formal recognition of customary land rights (Toulmin 
2008; Kanji et al. 2007). Thus, the results of our analysis support the view that carbon forestry 
and other PES schemes should accommodate the traditional African customary tenure 
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systems, and if designed successfully, can both promote tree-based carbon sequestration and 
benefit the poor (Jindal et al. 2008; Unruh 2008). 
However, our results show that tenure security, especially if it involves a threat of eviction 
from the land, is still a problem for PES schemes.  Under customary land rights, tenure 
security is contingent upon continued use of the land and eviction is likely when land is scarce 
and when land is abandoned for extended time.   This is not the same situation as when 
smallholders have land tenure that is insecure, transitory, or weakly enforced.  The latter case 
does inhibit both farmers' participation in carbon forestry schemes and the amount of cropland 
they devote to tree planting.  Unfortunately, the problem of insecure tenure remains prevalent 
throughout much of the developing world. 
Finally, all poor smallholders face significant transaction costs to participating in long-term 
PES schemes, such as for carbon forestry, especially in developing countries with poor 
institutions (Bromley 2008; Wunder 2005; Swallow and Meinzen-Dick 2009).  Although the 
analysis of such transaction costs was not the focus of our paper, the actual design of carbon 
forestry PES schemes need to consider them seriously in order to be effective in encouraging 
the participation of poor farmers. 
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